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LA INCIDENCIA DE LAS POLITICAS MIGRATORIAS Y DE LAS REDES COMUNITARIAS EN EL DESARROLLO DE UN SISTEMA DE MIGRACIONES INTERNACIONALES EN EL CONO SUR

(En inglés)

Jorge Balán

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Resumen

El trabajo analiza el surgimiento y desarrollo de un sistema de migraciones internacionales en el Cono Sur cuyo centro gravitacional es la Argentina. Lo hace desde el punto de vista de las politicas migratorias argentinas a partir de 1930 y de las comunidades de migrantes que se forman a ambos lados de la frontera. Distingue, por una parte, la "gran politica" pro-inmigratoria, que a partir de esos años adopta restricciones ideológicas y raciales más o menos explicitas, y por la otra, las politicas concretas que regulan la entrada y residencia de extranjeros. La primera ha ignorado la existencia de una migración laboral proveniente de paises limitrofes y ha inspirado politicas que no se adecúan a la realidad y fuerzan a adoptar amnistias periódicas. Estas politicas incentivan la obtencion de la residencia permanente legal como un medio para obtener entrada en el mercado de trabajo, favoreciendo la inmigración aún en periodos en que el ciclo economico no la justificaría. Las redes sociales de los inmigrantes, que se extienden a ambos lados de las fronteras, permiten una transmisión eficiente de información y facilitan los procesos migratorios; de allí que una vez establecida una comunidad de inmigrantes en el extranjero, dichas redes otorgan estabilidad al sistema. En el trabajo se analizan las etapas de la formacion del sistema durante las últimas décadas, comparando a la inmigracion de los cuatro paises de origen, y luego se discute el caso de la inmigración boliviana para ilustrar los efectos de las redes sociales a lo largo de aquellas etapas. Finalmente, se sugieren las posibles consecuencias de dos politicas alternativas para el futuro: la restriccion rígida de la entrada y del otorgamiento de residencias, y su opuesto, la firma de tratados bilaterales facilitando la entrada de trabajadores migrantes limitrofes.

IMMIGRATION POLICIES, COMMUNITY NETWORKS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MIGRATORY SYSTEM IN THE SOUHTERN CONE

Jorge Balán
Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES)
Buenos Aires, Argentina

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1. Introduction.

The role of economic factors in international migration, both at a macro and micro levels, is well known. Although they have been phrased within different theoretical contexts, most explanations elaborate on income differentials and excess labor demand and supply in relation to other productive factors as the key variables explaining variations in net migration between origin and destination. The existence of sovereign states, however, introduces always but in varying degrees the need to consider the issues of, first, the legal status of individuals in each of the countries involved (i.e., nationality, legal residence), and second, entry (and at times, exit) as well as residence policies of the same countries. Entry and residence restrictions are far more common and rigid than exit restrictions, and thus it is immigration policies which count as the most important factor in international migration outside of labor supply and demand and income differentials. As it happens with the latter, immigration policy is more fruitfully analyzed from the perspective of a two-country system, i.e., the set of policies and their enforcement in country A which are relevant for citizens or residents of country B, since policies tend to address to potential immigrants rather then to abstract cases.

Whatever the origins of a given flow (famine, persecution, jobs, proximity), and the policies which tend to regulate it, its existence results in the development of non-territorial, community networks, sustained at a micro level, which feed potential migrants relevant information for the decision making process about migration. Once such community has been established, individuals learn through this network about present and future job opportunities and the requirements to gain access to them. Thus, the

network plays a crucial role in filtering down information about policies actually enforced and in generating adaptive responses to them.

In this paper I will review the issue of international migration in the Southern Cone of South America from the complementary perspectives of, first, migration policies followed by the major country of immigration in the region, Argentina, vis-a-vis immigrants from some neighboring countries (as contrasted with policies followed in other cases), and second, the development and functioning of those non-territorial community networks in orienting individual or family behavior vis-a-vis the changing economic and policy environments relevant for migrant decision making processes. I will argue that immigration policies, although often inspired by very broad goals and showing explicit biases regarding the kinds of immigrants needed from the receipient country's perspective (what I will call here grand policies), are actually implemented within a specific two-country system in which considerably more narrow considerations are effective, resulting in concrete entry and residence policies which may or not be in agreement with grand policies. Grand policies in recent decades have been out of tune with reality, while entry policies geared to restrict immigration have had at times unexpected, and perhaps unwanted, functions. The effects of economic fluctuations have been weakened by policies incentivating continous residence in the country of destination, while the main force towards stability in migratory flows is to be found at the micro level. The establishment of a network of social relations linking specific areas of origin and destination and concrete needs of individuals and families who are involved in the migratory system brings stability to a system in which economic and policy determinants fluctuate in cycles.

To what extent can we speak of an international migration system in the Southern Cone of South America? How can we describe such system today? In order to answer tentatively these questions, it seems appropriate to begin by describing the elements presumably involved. These are sovereign states, the logical units in international migration since national sovereignty implies the state's right to regulate the movement of people across national borders. These states emerged during the first half of the nineteenth century as a consequence of independence. Under Spanish rule, their territories were politically organized within one single vice-royalty which included what today is Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The wars of independence and internal strife eventually resulted in a set of sovereign states whose borders often became a source of conflict until these days. All of them, except for Chile, also share borders with Brazil, which after independence preserved the territorial and administrative unity inherited from the Portuguese empire.

In spite of some major conflicts between two or more countries in the region, borders have been only temporarily closed, and never very effectively so. On the contrary, trade has always been very active, although subject to considerable long-term fluctuations. In recent decades, a number of bilateral agreements have facilitated the constant flow of people and goods across national boundaries. The flow of people has increased even more dramatically than the flow of goods with the decrease in the relative cost of transportation: tourism, small scale trade and business trips, studying abroad, temporary labor migration (both legal and increasingly illegal), and permanent migration, all are much more common today even if all of them have strong roots in the past. Brazil and Argentina, due to their relative size, are major economic partners for Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, and to a

lesser extent for Chile, besides of being important to each other. Thus, they tend to become centers within a system of bilateral relations.

Brazil, unlike Argentina, has not evolved into an important gravitational center for migratory flows vis-a-vis its neighbors. Transatlantic immigration has been of importance for Brazil since the nineteenth century and until the 1930's, but the relative abundance of unskilled labor has inhibited the development of labor migration from border countries. Argentina, on the contrary, became a major country of destination for its neighbors. Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay became countries of out-migration in the twentieth century, although the timing and extent of emigration has varied much. What they have in common is that Argentina has been the major, but by no means only, country of destination for people leaving them. National censuses consistently show that Argentina is the major country of residence for nationals of those countries currently living abroad, an indicator of a broader phenomenon which includes other kinds of migrants which go uncounted by national censuses. Data presented in Table 1 clearly show that nationals from Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay enumerated in other countries are to be found mainly in Argentina. There is also a number of Argentine citizens counted by census operations in the other four countries, reflecting a counter-flow which includes many Argentine born children of returned immigrants, but they make up only a small proportion of the total number of Argentines counted abroad.

The major international migration flows in the Southern Cone, thus, may be grouped in two sets: on one hand, a set which results in net migration favorable to Argentina and unfavorable to the four other Spanish speaking countries, and on the other, another set of more selective out-migrant flows from each of them (including Argentina) to the rest of the

world, mainly North America, Europe, and Australia (Balán, 1985). Here I will discuss only the first system, centered around Argentina. This country is much larger, both in territory and population, has a better endowment of natural resources and a more diversified economy which, under normal circumstances, generates jobs attractive to workers living in the other four countries. Proximity as well a cultural continuities (i.e., the same national language, a common history, and the like) make borders quite fragile as barriers to mobility, and bilateral agreements facilitate the flow of people and goods across them. While Bolivia and Paraguay are very poor, recently urbanizing countries, with marked ethnic, cultural, and educational differences with Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are not. Although labor migration has been a common element in border immigration in recent decades, political events in countries of origin, by themselves as well as combined with economic consequences, have also played an important role giving each flow some unique characteristic. Thus, the four cases may be treated to some extent as four systems having in common one country of destination, even if all together do conform one system in the sense of a stable set of relations between the five countries involved. Some differences become evident by looking at foreign born nationals from the four countries counted by the Argentine census in 1980, although undocumented immigrants are largely absent from this counting (see Table 2). Bolivia and Paraguay show the highest and lowest sex ratios, respectively, indicating that in both cases labor migration of workers coming alone (as contrasted to family migration) is more common than in the other two cases. A larger proportion of Uruguayan and Chilean nationals arrived during the last decade, probably a consequence of the deep political and economic crises which both countries suffered in the 1970's. Also, the relatively higher level

of education shown by these two nationalities, and mainly by Uruguayans, is an indicator of a broader cultural and class difference of immigrants as well as of the population in origin.

2. Argentina: grand policies and entry policies.

Immigration has been a matter of fundamental importance for Argentine policy makers ever since Independence in 1810. The need to settle the thinly populated country in order to become what was then called a "civilized" society, and today we may call a developed one, was deeply felt. Together with most other Latin American countries, Argentina established grand policies to attract European immigration in order to achieve this goal. The 1853 constitution explicitely favored European immigration and granted all civil rights to foreign residents, thus establishing an open door policy. Such policy was congruent during the years of massive transatlantic immigration (1870-1930) with entry policies, which established minimum criteria to limit the admission or permanence of immigrants on the basis of sanitary considerations, health status, or political risks, and stimulated the entrance of specific categories of immigrants. The actual flow of immigrants, however, largely reflected the growth of economic opportunities in Argentina as seen by potential immigrants in other countries. The shape of the net migration curve was determined by the Argentine economic cycle, while the origin of immigrants can be explained by the pre-existing link with countries which were undergoing deep economic crises (i.e., Spain and Italy); by the existence of special colonization programs, state or privately sponsored, which entailed bilateral agreements; or by the spontaneous inflow from a variety of countries in an era of great expansion of transatlantic trade (Balán, 1985). In any case, the grand policies which established the overall preferences and which considered immigration from

the exclusive point of view of incorporation into the national society, were an imporant background factor which was maintained with no important change until the 1920's.

The world economic depression in itself would have resulted in a sudden decline of immigration, as it had previously happened with the economic crises in 1890 and 1913. But 1930 represents the end of an era because of the long term disruption in world trade of which immigration was part, and also because of changes in policy which reflected as much the new economic situation as a change in the ideological premises of grand policies. The post 1930 period, however, may be neatly divided in two: between 1930 and the early 1950's, when Argentina was still hoping to reestablish the flow of European immigration (although with important differences with the pre 1930 period), and between the mid 1950's and today, when such hopes have been relegated to an empty rethoric which provides little guidance for entry policies, which are established in view of new potential sources of immigration.

a) 1930-1950's. During the depression Argentina established, for the first time, entry restrictions based upon employment considerations (Olivieri, 1987). There was fear of growing unemployment, and the government decreed in 1932 sharp limitations to the entry of foreign workers. Although the economy was recovering soon afterwards, the end of an open door policy reflected ideological issues of a broader nature than strictly economic ones. Argentine grand policy, it should be clear, was geared to incorporate citizens into the national society, and not just workers into the economy. In the 1930's Argentine elites reconsidered the kinds of immigrants the country wanted to incorporate as citizens. Political and racial considerations became paramount. They had been present in the past, as shown by the legislation

allowing the executive to expell or deny entrance to politically dangerous elements since 1902. Also, in the 1920's Argentine consulates abroad had already been instructed to require documentation often unavailable to displaced persons, and also to refuse admission to "undesirables," i.e., beggars, criminals, anarchists, communists (Avni, 1983; Mirelman, 1988). Large numbers were still arriving who would not fall into either category. But in the 1930's potential immigrants were, more often than not, political refugees, and the Argentine government reacted to them as undesirable elements for Argentine society.

The Spanish Civil War was a test case. Although Spanish immigration had been the oldest and second largest, it was now being considered under a very different light. Argentine society was deeply divided by the war, as was the Spanish resident community. In spite of great opposition, the Argentine government effectively restricted admission of refugees. The executive defended the policy of bilateral agreements, while refugees were not protected by those countries from which they were leaving. Thus, Spanish Basques, Polish, and Jews in general, were being denied legal admission. A special, autonomous immigration body was created to establish special requirements to admit exiled and refugees, while Argentine consulate offices abroad were instructed to apply strict sanitary and political rules.

The pre-existence of communities originated in the areas of Europe where a refugee problem was developing was responsible both for the growth of potential immigrants from those areas and for their entry through legal or illegal means. Among the latter, the most common was entrance through a border country (like Paraguay), which sold transit visas to potential immigrants who would then cross the border and settle without proper documents in Argentina with help from relatives, friends, and

community organizations. Grand policies were still inspiring the Argentine government to legislate about colonization programs to settle immigrants in interior, underpopulated areas, when it was effectively denying admission to politically undesirable immigrants who very often found their way into the country with the help of community networks.

While the Second World War seriously limited the flow of people across the Atlantic, its end posed another challenge to Argentine policy makers. Since January, 1944, the Argentine government had formally forbidden the entrance of foreign nationals from beligerant countries, and limited the mobility of those already living in Argentina. By the end of the war, the Argentine government lifted those restrictions and established a special office in Rome to channel the entrance of European refugees with great independence from the Argentine immigration office, and actually established implicit political and racial criteria to encourage the reception of some refugees and deny entry to others (i.e., slavs, Jews). Other criteria were also relevant: Argentine industrialists, as well as the armed forces, were interested in recruiting technically competent individuals displaced by the war, including of course military technicians, but ethnic and political criteria prevailed at the operational level (Senkman, 1985).

However, in quantitative terms the major development after the war was the upsurge of Italian immigration under a special, bilateral agreement. Almost one-half million immigrants from that country came to Argentina between 1947 and 1955 (Olivieri, 1987). For a few years, everything lead to predict that this flow would be large and continous: the deep Italian crisis after the war, which contrasted with industrial growth under labor scarcity conditions in Argentina; the bilateral agreement, signed in 1947, which coordinated and subsidized the flow of immigrants, favored by all politically

relevant groups on both sides of the Atlantic; the existence of an old and large community of Italians in Argentina; and the prevailing pattern of family (rather than single) migration. However, the reversal of economic conditions in the 1950's, a major recession in Argentina and the expansion of economic opportunities elsewhere in Europe, resulted in a large return flow and eventually a sudden decline in immigration. By the mid 1950's Italian (and European) mass immigration to Argentina was a thing of the past.

Although 1930 marked a long term change in entry policies, there was continuity in one important element of grand policy, namely, a consideration of immigration as part and parcel of a broader population policy for an underpopulated country. According to the prevailing views, Argentina badly needed a larger population to establish a better adjustment to resources, defend unstable frontiers, expand internal markets, and so on. Although labor scarcity was indeed an issue, grand policy was geared to attract permanent settlers. The debate about exiles and refugees in the 1930's and 1940's was essentially one about Argentine nationality, the adjustment and incorporation of different ethnic groups into it, and the concrete political risks posed by immigrants. Demographic trends brought about by the sharp decline in immigration and the slowdown in birth rates since the 1920's, like sluggish growth and rapid aging, were feared. Pronatalist policies were thought of as an alternative to an open door policy due to the conflictive views about immigration. Only after the war, in the specific case of Italy and for only a few years, Argentina favored the immigrants it actually could most easily attract.

Since the mid 1930's, however, Argentina was also receiving other, considerably less noticed, immigration. It was coming from neighboring countries, and did not flow through the nation's capital and main port of

entry, Buenos Aires. In the Northwestern provinces, were sugar plantations had become the major dynamic sector of a backward, rural economy, Bolivian workers became a new source of seasonal labor in those years. The original flow was in part a consequence of the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932-5), since a number of soldiers deserted from the defeated Bolivian army and the war brought in lasting changes in the Bolivian countryside. Also, plantations had never found a long lasting source of seasonal workers in Northwestern Argentina, and started to face new difficulties with internal migration and urbanization from the mid 1930's on. Thus, they organized a system of seasonal labor migration across the border which would last for over three decades, until mechanization sharply reduced seasonal labor demand.

A similar process took place with Paraguayan workers in the Northeastern areas of intensive agriculture (*mate*, tea, cotton), which developed in the 1930's. Migrant workers under contract crossed the largely unprotected borders between the two countries. As in the Northwest, this trend intensified in the 1940's because of internal migration: immigrants fleeing civil war and economic disruption in Paraguay replaced Argentine workers attracted by industry to Buenos Aires. In the South, Chilean migrant workers were employed in all expanding economic sectors (like oil, wool, intensive agriculture, and later on construction industry and tourism) due to the absolute labor scarcity predominant in Patagonia. Already in the 1920's Chilean workers were contracted for seasonal labor in wool production and the developing oil industry, and ever since then they made up the main pool of unskilled and semi-skilled workers for any expanding rural or urban activity. In recent years Bolivian migrant workers joined them

Obvious differences in the three regions and in border immigration to them existed. However, they had in common several features which need to be highlighted since they initiated and characterized the bilateral systems in contrast to transatlantic immigration. All responded to the absolute scarcity of unskilled labor, mainly but not only of a seasonal character. This is typical of rural industries, demanding large numbers of workers only for some weeks or months during the year. Large scale employers, generally through labor contractors, were involved in developing the system of temporary migration, without much initial involvement by national governments on either side. As in other cases of rural, temporary labor, a combination of economic incentives and coercive mechanisms to retain contracted workers was initially used. Typically, contractors advanced payments to induce workers to sign up, and indebtedness was a mechanism to guarantee a labor supply until the crop season was over. The Argentine government paid little attention to all of them in the initial stages, since they were perceived primarily as the temporary entrance of workers, rather than settlers. These flows were out of the realm of grand policy, while entry policies ignored them until 1940, when border crossings became a source of concern for the Argentine government because of the refugee issue. Border crossings were a police problem outside the realm of immigration policy. Locally powerful groups, like plantation owners, had not difficulty at all to move workers in one direction or the other. Workers seldom required documentation to find jobs until the late 1940's, and even then temporary workers were explicitely excepted from normal requirements.

b) 1950's-1980's. The bilateral agreement with Bolivia in 1958 marked the beginning of a new period since it recognized the existence of temporary flows of workers into the country, attempting to set a legal

framework for them. The agreement established cooperation to protect the rights of temporary workers, granting them permits to enter Argentina through some entry points and remain a limited period for work purposes, with the corresponding duty to leave the country when such period elapsed. Similar agreements were signed with Chile and Paraguay. The new policy was strictly a labor migration policy established in part as a consequence of changes in labor legislation enacted throughout the late 1940's and early 1950's. In those years rural labor became the subject of new legislation limiting the coercive power of landowners and labor contractors and fostering the unionization of rural workers. Bilateral agreements were meant to regulate also the use of foreign workers as a competition to weaken bargaining power of local workers. Rural unions managed to include foreign workers (and thus increase union dues) while limiting their participation in union affairs. Thus, a system of legal temporary migration developed which reflected new institutional forces in the labor market and was meant to restrict the rights of border immigrants to that of host workers expected to return. Such legislation was poorly implemented since temporary workers found a widening of job opportunities throughout the year in the region, and thus resulted in an increase in the numbers of illegal residents who had originally arrived under its protection. The further development of job opportunities in the urban labor market in the 1960's and 1970's reinforced this trend, but now most workers were arriving with tourist cards rather than as temporary workers. The cumulative process originally fostered by rural industries and labor contractors had resulted in a changing institutional framework and in the growth of a resident community of immigrants (to be discussed in the following section) which sustained a persistent flow of illegals into Argentina.

European immigrants throughout Argentine history, with the important exception of refugees during the 1930's and 1940's, arrived in the country with proper documentation allowing them to take up residence and work in the country. Immigration from neighboring countries, on the contrary, was characterized from the very beginning by irregular documentation (Mármora, 1983; Novick, 1986). The bilateral agreements of the 1950's were one attempt to provide temporary workers with an appropriate legal framework. But many more migrants from neighboring countries kept arriving without proper documentation for work, and took up illegal residence in the country.

For the last four decades, foreigners willing to become residents of Argentina have had three different alternatives: first, to obtain an entry permit allowing them to become permanent residents upon entering the country; applications for such permits have to be filed in Argentine consulates abroad. Second, to change their legal status after arrival as temporary residents and while in the country, i.e., by applying to the national immigration office in Argentina. And third, to regularize residence status under an amnesty, i.e., to change status from illegal to legal residents (de Marco, 1986; Sassone, 1987). While European immigrants, or more recently Asians, normally arrive with permanent resident status, Latin American immigrants follow the other two routes, i.e., they arrive documented as tourists, stay beyond the period allowed as such, very often start working immediately, and change their status through the second or third routes mentioned above. They do so because the restrictions established for the first time in the 1930's have been maintained, one way or another, with the end of the traditional open door policy. The selective criteria established (i.e., skills and/or capital, work contracts, and the like)

tend to leave them out. They qualify for resident status either under family reunion criteria, which they may show already while in Argentina, or under the benefits of an amnesty.

Amnesties became since the 1940's part and parcel of immigration policy (Mármora, 1983; Balán and Lépore, 1987). The very first one was granted in 1949, and was applied through 1951. It's explicit goal was to regularize the legal status of those foreigners who had arrived in violation of established entry policies, i.e., refugees not admitted as such before, during, and after the war. Beneficiaries included both victims of the expansion of nazism in Europe and collaborators in the nazi regimes. This and the following amnesty, granted in 1958, were geared to facilite the social and economic integration of immigrants by regularizing their status in the country, although the latter already covered many new immigrants from bordering countries. Three more amnesties have been decreed since then, all explicitely covering border immigrants and reflecting implicitely the incongruence between established entry policies and the characteristics of potential immigrants to Argentina. While the Argentine government normally sustains a restrictive policy, which is made even more restrictive under the ideological atmosphere prevailing with military rule, immigrants still arrive and stay who cannot fit those requirements and therefore cannot apply through the regular mechanisms for permanent residence. Periodic amnesties are granted as emergency solutions for problems created by the government's inability to adequate entry policies to reality (Mármora, 1983).

This inadequacy increased with changes in the nature of border immigration to Argentina. The latter has gone through three distinct stages. The initial stage, already described, was a system of seasonal labor migration originated as a consequence of local demands and available sources of

workers abroad, initially without any governmental policy and later on under bilateral agreements. The second stage started with the growth of resident (legal or illegal) communities of aliens in some interior regions, and thus the search for all year around employment opportunities, either as farm workers in the harvest of various products, or in urban jobs. The development of these communities stimulate temporary entrants to remain in the country longer, and thus increase their size and diversity. The third stage is characterized by the entrance of workers intending to find jobs available all the year around, with no initial passage through seasonal labor; they tend to arrive as tourists, rather than as workers with temporary permits. By this time, also, a number of people have dual residence status and flow in and out of the country as part of a personal or family strategy.

Bilateral agreements solved the legal issues posed by the first stage, but they did not foresee a solution for migrants who overstayed. The tendency to do so, furthermore, increased over time (stage two) and created the need for amnesties (i.e., in 1958 and 1964). But on stage three the nature of labor demand had changed, now being primarily urban (i.e., in manufacture or construction) and potential immigrants did not arrive any longer within a temporary work scheme covered by bilateral contracts. They now found jobs throughout the country with the help of the resident community and expecting eventually to acquire legal residence through normal procedures or periodic amnesties. The latter changed from an emergency response to a de facto situation and an expected routine which entails a policy of sorts, i.e., that of covering up the inadequacy of current entry policies.

Another recent development is the change in immigrant flows due to changes in political regimes in the Southern Cone. Political reasons had

forced the exile of elite groups from all of the countries involved in this system in the past, but large scale political exile became a phenomenon only recently, the first instance being the civil war which lead to the Stroessner regime in Paraguay in 1947. The increase in Chilean emigration during the 1970's and early 1980's was related to the downfall of the Allende regime and the high unemployment in the Chilean economy during the first decade of military rule. Also, Uruguayan out-migration, which became chronic in the late 1960's, peaked in 1973-5 as a response to both political and economic conditions. In both cases Argentina was the main, but by no means the only, receipient of immigrants from these two countries. Argentina itself became a source of political exiles in the 1970's, and its policies towards refugees changed drastically over time. Thus, Chilean refugees in 1973 were admitted into the country, but found an increasingly hostile environment and were encouraged to find asylum elsewhere. Most Uruguayans arriving between 1973-5 were not formally refugees, and could remain in the country, but were often subject of political harrasment. In both cases a large number of new arrivals remained in Argentina without legal residence status. Although political and economic reasons to migrate are often interacting, political refugees tend to show in the Southern Cone as elsewhere higher selectivity than purely economic migrants.

Politics has also played a role in the Southern Cone due to border conflicts. Thus, the Beagle conflict between Chile and Argentina led the latter to impose serious restrictions to Chilean citizens in 1978; during a few years, no permanent residence status was granted to them, but rather only temporary ones. The return to a constitutional government which signed a peace treaty with Chile made Chilean nationals the largest category of applicants under the 1984 amnesty.

Data shown on Table 3 are useful, first, to analyze the various means through which border immigrants enter into Argentina and eventually obtain legal status as residents, and second, to estimate the volume of new immigration from border countries. However, it should be born in mind that the latter is a risky exercise, since the adoption of legal residence normally takes place several years after arrival. Net migration, as estimated from official entry and exit statistics, is not discussed here due to the unreliability of the latter. Permanent entry permits have been seldom used in the last decade or so by border immigrants. Thus, for this category we may safely restrict ourselves to normal versus amnesty applications to obtain legal residence while already living in Argentina.

There is a large variation between nationalities in the proportion applying through each of these two mechanisms. Immigrants from Chile and Paraguay, more often than not, obtained legal residence through amnesties, while Bolivians are almost equally divided and Uruguayans overwhelmingly obtained residence through normal procedures. The 1974 amnesty favored mainly Paraguayans, while the 1984 amnesty included a large number of Chileans. While the former were almost exclusively labor migrants attracted by the rapid growth of industry in Buenos Aires between 1964-1974 (unlike previous decades, they were now settling mainly in urban areas), the latter were almost equally divided between workers finding jobs in the Argentine south and others (including exiles) settling in large urban centers. The refusal of the Argentine government to grant permanent residence to Chileans during many years explains their heavy response to the amnesty decree of 1984. Bolivians make up the most stable category of candidates for residence along this period, and their numbers are almost equally divided between the two categories analyzed here. Uruguayans, on the

contrary, are relatively newcomers within this picture. The big wave of Uruguay nationals into Argentina is noticeable during the mid 1970's. The largest number of applicants followed the normal, as opposed to the amnesty, procedure. Also, among border country immigrants this is the only nationality from which a large number obtain permanent residence permits while still in Uruguay. Their success in doing so, probably a consequence of their higher average education, explains why so few of them had to apply through the amnesty procedure.

Variations in volume of residence permits granted by type of procedure and nationality reveals both the timing of some evident push or pull factors and the differential impact of entry policies. Argentine policies throughout the last two decades have suffered from regime changes and their respective biases. Amnesties have always been granted by constitutional governments, more prone to respond to popular pressures than military ones, while the latter have imposed greater legal restrictions to foreign settlement in frontier regions. Policies in neither case have been totally coherent, however, and various office in fact carry out contradictory policies during the same administration. Thus, the analysis of grand policies and of entry and residence policies should not assume coherence or efficient enforcement. Rather, what policies tend to do is to provide channels and barriers which potential immigrants will evaluate, the same way they do evaluate other variables in their immediate environment.

There is little correlation between the growth and decline in economic opportunities in Argentina and the number of border immigrants applying successfully for residence status. Certainly, these applications take place some time after actual entry into the country, but there is no lagged correlation either. Also, economic and political conditions in origin may

affect the flow independently from opportunities in destination. But probably the major issue involved in the apparent lack of correlation is due to the fact that the volume of new entrants is guaranteed by the operation of the system which makes residence status a goal in itself and the non-territorial community a powerful means to achieve this goal. What is at stake here is the number of people who are added to the large community having dual residence status, a key sector of the wider group involved in the migratory system. While net immigration might be more responsive to changing opportunities, the growth of this category of potential migrants seems quite independent of them.

The last section of Table 3 shows the total number of immigrants from the four Spanish speaking border countries who were granted legal residence in Argentina between 1970 and 1987. Of course, we do not know how many of them have left the country or survive at present. Table 4 shows the number of foreign born residents counted by the Argentine national census in 1980 and since the first census in 1869. Most probably national censuses include all legal residents, while undocumented ones are not. These figures are useful to estimate the relative size of new immigration by nationality, but give only rough proxies of net immigration or even of foreign born residents actually present at any moment in time. They offer few clues about gross, rather than net, migration, since the search for temporary work and eventual return is probably much higher among some national groups (i.e., Bolivians) than others (i.e., Uruguayans).

3. Community, networks, and continuity in migratory flows.

Following Tilly, I have called non-territorial community to the network of social relations built around migration between a set of localities

in origin and another set in destination (Tilly, 1973). Participants in such community do identify with such localities, but develop a broader identity which they carry with them and renew through mobility. Here I want to discuss, in the specific case of Bolivian migration to Argentina, some characteristics of this community and how they help migrants cope with their environment. More narrowly, I will take up the issue of documentation and legal residence as crucial elements in such environment.*

Bolivian migrants until recently concentrated in the Argentine Northwest, where they had originally found work in sugar plantations and then moved into other rural and urban labor markets. Studies conducted in the early 1970's showed a clear distinction between migrants found in rural and urban areas in the Northwest (Whiteford, 1981). Workers in sugar plantations, tobacco farms and vineyards had arrived to Argentina in over one half of the cases as documented, temporary workers, i.e., under the provisions of the bilateral agreement. They had later on renewed their permits, or otherwise obtained an Argentine I.D. allowing them to work, except in the farms and vineyards where a sizeable number simply overstayed their temporary permits. Sugar plantations would not admit them to do so. In urban areas most migrants had arrived as tourists or had crossed the border without a work permit. This was a consequence of, on one hand, the greater spread of jobs which did not formally require documents, and on the other, the absence of urban employers who would organize contract work (as in plantations) and legalize the entry of temporary workers. However, urban residents had been quite successful in

*This section is largely based upon published and unpublished data obtained by Jorge Dandler and myself in a joint research project (Balán and Dandler, 1986; Dandler and Medeiros, in press).

obtaining Argentine documents after a couple of years, with over 80% having legalized their status when interviewed (Mármora, 1983).

The sugar harvest, or zafra, was used by Bolivian agricultural workers as a first step into Argentina since the 1930's and until the 1960's (Whiteford, 1981). Although plantations restricted permanence after the contract was over, the work camp operated as a center of informal arrangements facilitating decisions about postzafra activities. Migrants learned there about the circuit of labor demand for agricultural workers in various regional crops, as well about particular employers and how to obtain jobs without proper documentation. As Whiteford indicates, during this period migrants "...ask(ed) questions about labor laws, salaries, prices, availability of foods, national holidays, union activities, politics, and national-level soccer teams" (p. 70).

The decline in plantation labor demand with increasing mechanization during the 1960's, however, coupled with the steady flow of Bolivians into the region, resulted in a large labor force of mobile workers useful to agricultural producers who tended to diversify production in the region. Bolivian immigrants, both those who had taken up legal residence in Argentina and those coming for the first or second time, urbanized quickly. Now the provincial capital cities of Salta and Jujuy served as the main entry and distribution centers, in spite of the relative absence of large scale employers of unskilled wage workers. There was considerable reluctance on the part of agricultural workers to settle in the city, but most often than not the decline in zafra work made it imperative. In the city, all year around jobs, most of them in the informal economy, became available. Most of them required no documentation at all, but did provide a means for subsistence while appropriate documents were applied for. In fact, for many an urban

residence, even if in its periphery and with highly unstable work, represented the means for obtaining permanent legal residence and thus eventually access to better paying and more stable work.

The plantation work camp was replaced by the urban neighborhood as a center for the operation of community networks which operated on an increasingly larger and more diversified scale in Argentina. Simultaneously, however, another foothold of Bolivian immigration was being established in Buenos Aires, about one thousand miles away. As it usually happens, longer distance and greater risk was associated with a more selective immigration: newcomers were recruited more often than not among the heavily commercial, urbanizing centers in the central Bolivian valleys, such as Cochabamba. Surveys conducted in the 1970's and 1980's, furthermore, showed that the increase in Bolivian migration to Buenos Aires was fed by immigrants who had seldom had experience in zafra work, having arrived directly to the city in search for wage work in construction or manufacturing. In the city they tended to concentrate in a few, restricted areas, originally with a predominance of squatter settlements, but later on with a larger proportion living in working class neighborhoods in the periphery (Mugarza, 1981 and 1985).

The economics of Bolivian labor migration to Argentina, either in the case of the Nortwest or in that of Buenos Aires, is relatively simple. The demand of unskilled laborers at current wages in Argentina, which is unmet by local labor, generates expectations of much higher earnings than what is possible in Bolivia. This is more clearly the case when there is an increase in labor demand (i.e., a construction boom in Argentina), and when the exchange rate increases the purchasing power in Bolivia of money saved while working in Argentina. During the 1970's one or both conditions were

present in the urban labor market, and thus it was predictable that the flow of Bolivian immigration would continue in spite of radical changes in entry policies. Between 1976 and 1978 residence became more restricted. The Argentine military government incentivated the return of migrants from Buenos Aires by offering free tickets back home, or through squatter settlement erradication and the harrasment of undocumented workers. Policies were widely publicized, so both residents in Argentina and potential immigrants learned quickly about them. Yet, they were largely inefficient in the face of a boom in both public and private construction and economic policies which resulted in an overvaluation of the Argentine currency (Mugarza, 1981). Those who had to leave squatter settlements in the central city moved to new neighborhoods in the periphery. Several hundred residents returned to Bolivia. But undocumented migrants kept arriving probably in even higher numbers than before. Thus, policies were either implemented with little coherence or inneficiently in face of powerful economic determinants.

How to explain, however, the continuous flow of immigrants in the 1980's, when Argentina entered into a prolonged economic recession and experienced a sharp devaluation of its currency? As I have already shown, the number of Bolivians applying for permanent residence actually increased during this decade. On one hand, this is a consequence of previous immigration: those who had arrived during the boom years could now obtain legal residence, and would remain to do so in spite of a less attractive labor market. On the other, legal conditions in themselves created a flow of immigrants, since labor migration becomes incorporated within the family economy and life cycle in areas of origin. In other words, appropriate documentation in Argentina, and thus permanent access to a more

diversified labor market with considerably higher wages than the current Bolivian ones, becomes an important goal in itself within the community of Bolivian migrants. The decline in a major source of jobs for migrants once the flow, and a community, are established, does not inhibit the continuous replacement of temporary immigrants and the process of settlement as permanent residents by a large number of them. In fact, a major function of Argentine entry policies is to stimulate the continuity of flows above and beyond the sharp fluctuations in the relevant economic variables.

The development of a community of migration in areas of origin may be visualized at a local level: in Bolivia, as in other countries of out-migration, regions and localities are rather sharply differentiated by the intensity of the flow, which is correlated with the number of people who has previously engaged in migration. Communities of migration in origin have in common, on one hand, a territorial basis (i.e., locality specialization), and on the other, a system of return migration which feeds them back information about opportunities in destiation. Locality specialization is at times difficult to trace back in history, and also is not apparently easy to explain. It is as if some fortuitous event determined, some time in the past, that a few members of the community left and either returned to or at least kept close contact with it, so that information kept flowing about opportunities and access to them. Once such thing happened, migrant labor became a part of the local economy, and individuals and families incorporated such phenomenon as an element in their lives.

In fact, the process is considerably less fortuitous than what it seems. In Bolivia there is high correlation between a set of characteristics which may explain why migration to Argentina is present or not: localities where migration is present tend to be located in areas with better communications

(i.e., valley rather than highland), more prolonged and intense commercialization, deeper acculturation (i.e., more Spanish speakers), and a more diversified peasant economy (i.e., trade and crafts as well as agricultural production). These characteristics have developed in the very long run, most probably being rooted in pre-colonial history, since the Spanish conquest was considerably more successful in areas were Inca rule had brought greater ethnic heterogeinity and spatial mobility (Larson, in press). In any case, what they do is explain differential propensity for localities to become the home of a migrant community and to incorporate labor migration to Argentina as a permanent element in the socio-economic structure as well as in local culture.

Return migration to those localities is made possible by the continuity of the small scale, peasant economy in urban areas and villages. Agrarian reform in the 1950's was largely responsible for the maintenance of such economy, since it gave access to the land and freed peasants from labor duties in exchange for it. In areas where greater commercialization and acculturation were already present, agrarian reform resulted in increased economic diversification, including wage migrant labor abroad as an alternative incorporated into the local economy as a source of cash income complementary to other activities (Dandler and Medeiros, in press). Thus, a culture of migration developed over time, with a time schedule fitting both yearly cycles (i.e., labor demand in local activities), life cycles (i.e., age at which migration is expected), and fluctuations in markets. These schedules become institutionalized within a wider framework, so that men, rather than women, and those men in the process of becoming independent adults, are expected to invest in the future through migration. This investment includes the earning of cash for some purchases (i.e., a house-in order to get married)

and also obtaining permanent entry into the Argentine labor market (i.e., Argentine documentation). As a consequence, in some localities between 25 to 50% of men aged 35 have engaged in temporary migration to Argentina, and about half of them have acquired some documentation allowing them to return in the future. The high sex ratio among Bolivian migrants to Argentina results from the many economic roles open to women in Bolvia, and explains the very high rate of return migration in this group when compared to other countries of origin (Balán and Dandler, 1986). In sum, past migration becomes the best predictor of future migration through the operation of an informational network which results, among other things, in a number of people who have gained permanent access to the Argentine labor market while maintaining a foot on a small scale, diversified economy, in which women play a very important role.

4. Conclusion.

I have dealt here with international migration in the Southern Cone, where flows of people and goods across national borders is made easy by cultural, political, and geographical factors. Although the economic determinants of such flows are indeed paramount, I have analyzed in particular the roles of immigration policies by the main receiving country, Argentina. I have discussed how the overall policy followed by this country has changed since the 1930's, while still oriented to stimulate the permanent settlement of transatlantic (rather than border) immigrants. The concrete entry and residence policy, which is relevant to the latter, combines restrictive rules regarding permanent residence, which leave many potential immigrants out, with entry policies allowing many of them to become illegal residents, and with periodic amnesties geared to regularize the status of the

latter. I have argued that these policies, which suffer important fluctuations over time, have actually placed a premium over the acquisition of residence status, and have thus favored the continuous flow of potential immigrants willing to obtain it. Residence status becomes, within the immigrant communities which develop at both sides of the border, an investment giving permanent access to the labor market in Argentina. Such communities, through the information network they sustain, make possible the whole process of acquiring residence status. The persistence of a small scale economy in areas of origin has incorporated migrant labor as a key element, an important part of the diversification strategies of such economy which requires that some family members undergo the process of residence status acquisition. Here I have not dealt with these strategies per se, but rather I have tried to understand how they work in combination with migrant communities to adjust to the consequences of Argentine migration policies.

One possible conclusion of this analysis is that the migratory system established by the joint operation of labor supply and demand in both economies, coupled with the social arrangements built by migrant communities, have defeated the explicit purposes of Argentine immigration policies. Or that the latter have been so poorly enforced, and have suffered from such discontinuities over time, that they have only added some noise to the operation of the migratory system. In any case, this conclusion invites speculation about possible consequences of radical changes in policy. One extreme would be for the Argentine government to sustain over time a much more rigidly enforced policy regarding entrance and permanence of foreign citizens from neighboring countries. The major difficulty here would be to have a continous policy in this regards, and change expectations built within the migrant community. Another extreme would be the signature of

bilateral (or multilateral) agreements giving reciprocal working rights to citizens of these countries. This common market agreement is unlikely to develop in the short or medium range, but would not be likely to result in massive permanent flows. Rather, the previous analysis would lead to predict that by facilitating temporary work contracts without placing any premium in acquiring permanent residence such agreements would not radically change the actual operation of the migratory system as it exists now, and would tend to alleviate some of its costs and inequities.

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Table 1

Population born in the Southern Cone countries enumerated in countries different from the country of birth, circa 1980.

Country of Enumeration	Country of Birth				
	Argentina	Bolivia	Chile	Paraguay	Uruguay
Argentina	--	115.616	207.176	259.449	109.724
Bolivia	14.669	--	7.508	4.730	193
Chile	19.733	6.298	--	284	989
Paraguay	43.670	500	1.560	--	2.310
Uruguay	19.051	247	1.006	1.593	--
All Others	137.342	36.194	106.509	21.750	46.658

Source: CELADE, "Investigación de la migración internacional en Latinoamérica (IMILA)", Boletín Demográfico, XIX, No. 37, January 1986.

Table 2

Selected characteristics of border country immigrants in Argentina, 1980.

Characteristics	Country of Birth			
	Bolivia	Chile	Paraguay	Uruguay
Percent Male	55.2	52.3	46.1	48.3
Percent arrived:				
Before 1960	37.9	34.8	38.9	23.0
1960 - 1969	29.4	18.0	27.0	11.5
1970 - 1980	32.7	47.2	34.1	65.5
Percent did not complete primary school. *	63.0	57.6	63.6	41.3

* Population 10 years of age and over. No information included within this category.

Source: Same as Table 1.

Table 3

Argentina: New Immigrants from Border Countries, 1970-1987

a) Permanent Residence Granted (normal procedure)

	Bolivia	Chile	Paraguay	Uruguay	Others	Total
1970-72	9.858	11.534	21.727	5.032	14.238	62.389
1973-75	3.067	3.272	6.702	2.673	6.074	21.788
1976-78	4.388	6.827	13.165	21.566	8.725	54.671
1979-81	7.701	1.534	16.257	19.833	27.358	57.281
1982-84	6.894	8.941	9.466	14.344	11.823	51.468
1985-87	15.320	31.032	12.295	24.350	10.366	93.363
total	47.228	63.140	79.612	87.798	78.584	340.960

b) Permanent Residence Granted (amnesties)

	Bolivia	Chile	Paraguay	Uruguay	Others	Total
1974*	22.725	24.711	74.109	17.173	9.485	148.203
1984*	18.739	75.566	20.430	19.302	8.293	142.330
total	41.464	100.277	94.539	36.475	17.778	290.533

c) Entry with Permanent Residence Visa

	Bolivia	Chile	Paraguay	Uruguay	Others	Total
1971-75	737	16.533	6.885	4.926	**	**
1976-78	140	783	234	1.918	7.065	10.140
1979-81	145	101	183	1.001	8.630	10.060
1982-84	268	177	177	1.237	10.044	11.903
1985-87	276	342	82	794	11.174	12.668
total	1.566	17.936	7.561	8.876		

d) Grand Total (a+b+c), 1970-87

90.258	181.353	181.712	133.149

* Year when amnesty decree was signed, not necessarity when residence status was granted under such decree.
** Unavailable

SOURCE: Unpublished data, Dirección Nacional de Migraciones, Departamento Estudios y Promoción, and for section c) 1971-5, de Marco (1986, p.341).

Table [4]

Argentina: Foreign Born Population from Border Countries
Census Data, 1869-1980

Census	Bolivians	Chileans	Paraguayans	Uruguayans	Total
1869	6.194	10.883	3.288	15.076	41.360
1895	7.361	20.594	14.562	48.650	115.892
1914	18.256	34.568	28.992	88.656	207.101
1947	47.774	51.563	93.248	73.640	313.264
1960	88.830	116.840	155.269	53.974	463.108
1970	101.000	142.150	230.050	58.300	580.100
1980	118.141	215.623	262.799	114.108	710.671

SOURCE: Argentine National Census/INDEC
1970 - CELADE estimate based on national census
1980 - National Census (Series D estimates)